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SIGNIFICANT RISK AND
FEASIBILITY-A PARADIGM FOR
INTERPRETING RECENT SUPREME
COURT OSHA DECISIONS: AMERICAN
PETROLEUM & AMERICAN TEXTILE
The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (the Act)1
authorizes the Secretary of Labor to establish standards regulating
workplace safety and health conditions. While section 3(8) of the
1 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976 & Supp. HI 1979). Congress passed the Occupational
Safety and Health Act in recognition of the "uneven, unbalanced, and incomplete" efforts of
the private sector, the states and the federal government in reducing the incidence of job-
related injury and illness. See 116 CONG. REc. 35,606 (1970), reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON
LABOR AND PuBLic WELFARE, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT OF 1970, at 297 (1971) (statement submitted by Sen. Saxbe) [hereinafter cited
as LEGIs. HIsT.]. During hearings on the proposed legislation, it was established that 14,500
workers were killed and at least 2.2 million were disabled on the job annually, causing an
annual loss of $1.5 billion to industry and of $8 billion to the gross national product. More-
over, the trend appeared to be worsening, especially in light of the ever-increasing use of
new, potentially toxic substances. S. REP. No. 91-1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-5 (1970), re-
printed in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5177, 5177-81, and reprinted in LEGIS.
HIST., supra, at 142-45. Hailed as a "safety bill of rights" for the nation's workers, Williams,
Foreward to LEGIS. HIsT., supra, at iii, the Act was envisioned as comprehensive legislation
which would apply to all industries and rally a single national effort to improve workplace
safety and health. 116 CONG. REC. 35,607 (1970), reprinted in LEGIS. HIsT., supra, at 297.
The Act applies to all employers engaged in business affecting interstate commerce, 29
U.S.C. § 652(3) (1976), excluding federal and state governments, id. § 652(5), imposing upon
them a general duty to provide a working environment free from recognized hazards, id. §
654; see National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1261, 1265-67 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (construing the general duty clause). Additionally, the Act outlines an expansive, pre-
vention-oriented plan including research, recordkeeping, employee training, and, most im-
portantly, standard development and promulgation. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(1)-(13) (1976);
note 2 and accompanying text infra.
I See 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)-(c) (1976). The Act authorizes the Secretary to regulate work-
place safety and health conditions by issuing either permanent or emergency temporary
standards. Florida Peach Growers Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 489 F.2d 120, 124 (5th Cir.
1974); see 29 U.S.C. § 655(b), (c) (1976). The Act also provides for 2-year interim standard-
setting authority, but this provision expired in April of 1973. 489 F.2d at 124 n.7; Dry Color
Mfrs. Ass'n v. Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98, 99 n.1 (3d Cir. 1973); see 29 U.S.C. §
655(a) (1976). Before issuing a permanent standard, the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration (OSHA) must comply with certain rulemaking procedures similar to infor-
mal rulemaking pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976 &
Supp. I 1979). 489 F.2d at 124; 486 F.2d at 101. For example, the proposed standard must
be published in the Federal Register and interested persons must be given 30 days to sub-
mit written data or comments. 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2) (1976). The Secretary then has 60 days
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Act dictates that such standards should ensure "conditions ...
reasonably necessary or appropriate" to provide a safe working en-
vironment,- section 6(b)(5) mandates that, in regulating toxic sub-
stances, the Secretary must adopt the standard "which most ade-
quately assures, to the extent feasible . . .that no employee will
suffer material impairment of health."4 Controversy has arisen
over the proper interpretation of these two sections and their effect
on the Secretary's authority to regulate toxic substances. 5 The Su-
in which to issue the standard. Id. § 655(b)(4). Emergency temporary standards, however,
are effective upon publication in the Federal Register, without resort to rulemaking proce-
dures, upon a showing that employees are subject to grave danger from toxic substance
exposure. Id. § 655(c)(1). Because of the possibility of circumventing the procedural safe-
guards intended to precede standard setting, the authority to issue emergency temporary
standards is limited to exigent circumstances. 489 F.2d at 130 & n.16; 486 F.2d at 104 &
n.9a. See generally 29 C.F.R. §§ 1911-.18 (1981); M. RoTHSTEiN, OccUPAToNAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH LAW 40-66 (1978).
3 See 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976).
' See id. § 655(b)(5). Section 655(b)(5) provides in part:
The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or
harmful physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most
adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evi-
dence, that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional
capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by
such standard for the period of his working life .... In addition to the attain-
ment of the highest degree of health and safety protection for the employee, other
considerations shall be the latest available scientific data in the field, the feasibil-
ity of the standards, and the experience gained under this and other health and
safety laws.
Id.
, Compare American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 501-05 (5th Cir. 1978),
aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448
U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion) (section 3(8) requires performance of cost-benefit analy-
sis in setting permanent standards) with AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 662-66, 676-77
(D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and vacated in part sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst.,
Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981) (section 6(b)(5) governs standard setting and does
not permit cost-benefit balancing) and United Steelworkers v. Marshall, 647 F.2d 1189,
1263-64 n.102 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (citing 617 F.2d at 662-66) (cost-benefit analysis would con-
travene the congressional goal of protecting worker health and safety within the limits of
economic possibility). In Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974),
the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia first interpreted the feasibility
language of section 6(b)(5) to include consideration of economic factors in standard setting.
Id. at 477. The court made clear, however, that the economic impact of a proposed standard
is not determinative of its feasibility. See id. at 477-78. The Third Circuit also adopted this
reasoning. See American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-37 (3d Cir. 1978);
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975). Defining the extent to which cost
properly may be considered, the District of Columbia court later expressly rejected the ap-
plicability of cost-benefit analysis to the standard-setting process. See 617 F.2d at 662-66,
676-77. Analogizing the Act to the Consumer Safety Act, however, the Fifth Circuit held
that the Act does require the performance of cost-benefit analysis. 581 F.2d at 501-05; see
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preme Court twice has addressed this issue. In Industrial Union
Department v. American Petroleum Institute,e the Court pro-
moted section 3(8) to a threshold requirement pursuant to which
the Secretary must find that a risk is significant before he may
promulgate any standard regulating such risk.7 Recently, however,
in American Textile Manufacturers Institute, Inc. v. Donovan,8
the Court held that section 6(b)(5) controls the regulation of toxic
substances once the threshold significant risk test has been satis-
fied and, moreover, that such section sanctions the imposition of
regulations calling for the taking of all steps feasible in order to
reduce exposures to toxic substances.9
In American Petroleum, the Court reviewed the validity of a
standard, promulgated under section 6(b)(5), which lowered the
permissible level of employee exposure to benzene. 10 When estab-
lishing the standard, the Occupational Safety and Health Adminis-
tration (OSHA)1 interpreted the section as requiring the standard
to be set either at the level which eliminates the risk or at the
lowest feasible level.1 2 Finding that there was no safe level of ben-
zene exposure, OSHA set the standard at the lowest level it consid-
ered technologically and economically achievable by the affected
TexasIndep. Ginners Ass'n v. Marshall, 630 F.2d 398, 411 (5th Cir. 1980).
' 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion), aft'g sub noma. American Petroleum Inst. v.
OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
7 448 U.S. at 642.
1 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981), affg in part and vacating in part 617 F.2d 636 (D.C. Cir.
1979).
1 101 S. Ct. at 2491-92.
10 448 U.S. 607, 611 (1980). Benzene is a toxic substance, which if inhaled is believed to
cause various blood disorders, including leukemia. Id. at 616-19. Although all persons are
exposed to small quantities of benzene vapors present in the ambient air, workers in indus-
tries which use benzene, such as the chemical processing, rubber manufacturing and petro-
leum refining industries, regularly are exposed to higher concentrations. Id. at 615-16. Inter-
estingly, service station attendants, one of the largest groups of workers exposed to
heightened levels of benzene as a result of their employment, specifically were excepted
from protection under the benzene standard. Id. at 616 n.6, 628. The first nationwide regu-
lation of benzene occurred in 1969 when the American National Standards Institute estab-
lished a national consensus standard setting the maximum permissible exposure limit to
benzene at 10 parts per million (ppm). Id. at 617. This standard was adopted as an interim
standard when the Act was passed. Id. at 617 & n.7; see note 2 supra. The proposed benzene
standard would have lowered the permissible exposure level from 10 ppm to 1 ppm. 448
U.S. at 623.
21 The Occupational Safety and Health Administration is the agency established within
the Department of Labor to administer the Act. 448 U.S. 607, 613 n.2 (1980).
12 Id. at 637 & n.42 (1980).
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industries. 8 The standard was challenged immediately on the
ground that OSHA had not shown it to be reasonably necessary or
appropriate in accordance with section 3(8). 14 Moreover, it was ar-
gued that the "reasonably necessary or appropriate" language re-
quires that the anticipated benefits of the standard justify the esti-
mated compliance cost as shown by the performance of cost-
benefit analysis.1 5 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals adopted this
reasoning and invalidated the standard."6 The Supreme Court af-
firmed, not on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, but rather, under
a newly fabricated test: significant risk.1
Writing for a plurality of the Court,18 Justice Stevens reiter-
13 Id. OSHA interpreted the feasibility language of section 6(b)(5) as mandating the
adoption of a standard "technologically achievable at a cost that would not impair the via-
bility of the industries subject to the regulation." Id. at 639. Thus, OSHA considered both
technological and economic factors in concluding that the proposed 1 ppm benzene standard
was feasible within the meaning of section 6(b)(5). Id. at 637.
14 Id. at 638. OSHA had dismissed section 3(8)'s "reasonably necessary or appropriate"
language, which provides the general definition for the phrase "occupational safety and
health standard," as having no legal significance, or, in the alternative, as imposing only a
minimum requirement of rationality upon the promulgation of standards under section
6(b)(5). Id. at 639.
15 Id. The industries which challenged the validity of the proposed benzene standard
interpreted section 3(8) as imposing substantive restraints on OSHA's authority to regulate
toxic substances, and as mandating the performance of cost-benefit analysis. Id.
11 American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978), aff'd sub nom.
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1981). In upholding the
industries' interpretation of section 3(8), the court of appeals approved their reliance on an
earlier Fifth Circuit decision construing similar language in the Consumer Safety Act as
requiring cost-benefit analysis. 581 F.2d at 501; see Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v. Consumer
Prod. Safety Comm'n, 569 F.2d 831, 839-40 (5th Cir. 1978). Notably, analogy to the Con-
sumer Safety Act was later criticized on the ground that the statute also uses the phrase
"unreasonable risk," traditionally indicative of a balancing of factors, accompanied by a
clear indication in its legislative history that such balancing was intended. See American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2491 n.30 (1981); AFL-CIO v. Marshall,
617 F.2d 636, 663 n.159 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
17 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 630-40 (1980)
(plurality opinion). The Court upheld the industry contention that section 3(8) imposes sub-
stantive restrictions on the setting of all standards under the Act, including those regulating
toxic substances pursuant to section 6(b)(5). The Court found that the threshold substan-
tive restriction contemplates the showing of a "significant" risk of disease. Id. at 639-40.
Absent a finding of significant risk in the instant case, the Court declined to address
whether section 3(8) imposes the additional requirement of performance of cost-benefit
analysis. Id.; see notes 20-22 and accompanying text infra.
18 Chief Justice Burger and Justice Stewart joined in an opinion authored by Justice
Stevens. The plurality invalidated the standard on the ground that it had not been predi-
cated upon a finding that the existing permissible exposure limit of 10 ppm presented a
significant risk of material harm to employees. 448 U.S. at 630-40. Justice Powell wrote a
separate opinion in which he concurred on the significant risk issue. Id. at 664-65 (Powell,
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ated the court of appeals' holding that section 3(8) applies to all
permanent standards issued under the Act, including those regu-
lating toxic substances.19 The plurality reasoned that the require-
ments of section 3(8) are incorporated by reference into section
6(b)(5), since this section is "just one species of the genus of stan-
dards" defined in section 3(8).20 The Court, however, interpreted
section 3(8) as limiting OSHA's regulatory authority to situations
which present a significant risk of harm.21 Since OSHA had not
made a threshold finding that exposure at existing permissible
levels presented such a risk, the Court affirmed the order setting
the standard aside.22 In a dissenting opinion, four Justices23 looked
to the Act's legislative history and concluded that section 3(8)
placed no limit on section 6(b)(5)'s broad mandate to adopt the
most protective standard feasible.24
J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Powell further opined, however, that in
addition to the significant risk requirement, section 3(8) also requires a determination
whether a standard's economic effects bear a reasonable relation to its anticipated benefits.
Id. at 667 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment). Justice Rehnquist concurred
in the judgment on the broader ground that the language of section 6(b)(5) is unconstitu-
tionally vague, providing virtually no guidelines for the setting of standards regulating toxic
substances. Id. at 671-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist stated that
he would invalidate the feasibility language of section 6(b)(5) as an impermissible delegation
of legislative authority to an administrative agency. Id. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
19 Id. at 642.
20 Id. The plurality reasoned that the provisions of section 3(8) are incorporated into
section 6(b)(5) since the latter section uses the word "standard" without indicating any ex-
ception from the general definition found in section 3(8). Id. The dissent considered the
feasibility language of section 6(b)(5) to be such a qualification of the general definition and
argued that the plurality's interpretation rendered the feasibility language superfluous. Id.
at 709 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The plurality responded to this argument by noting that
section 3(8)'s "reasonably necessary and appropriate" requirement determines the need for
regulation, at which point the feasibility language would dictate adoption of the most strin-
gent regulation feasible. Id. at 643 n.48. Moreover, the plurality found its interpretation
supported by the requirement in section 6(b)(5) that standards be directed to "'toxic
materials' and 'harmful physical agents"' and not to chemicals and other substances gener-
ally, thus indicating the need to find some heightened degree of risk. Id. at 643 (footnote
bmitted).
21 Id. at 642. In construing section 3(8) to require a finding of significant risk as a predi-
cate for standard setting, the plurality relied upon the fact that workers normally are ex-
posed to a certain degree of risk when they engage in nonwork-related activities, such as
driving a car or breathing polluted air, and that these activities are not considered "unsafe."
Id. The plurality further noted that the significant risk requirement would serve to ensure
that those standards which were promulgated would result in significant benefits. Id. at 644.
:2 Id. at 662.
3 Justice Marshall wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan, White
and Blackmun.
24 448 U.S. at 708-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall criticized the plural-
ity's interpretation of the interplay between sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5) as an impermissible
1982]
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American Textile, the second recent case in which the Court
considered the interplay of sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5), involved a
challenge to the cotton dust standard promulgated under section
6(b)(5). 25 Finding that exposure to cotton dust at existing levels
presented a significant health risk to employees,"6 OSHA set the
cotton dust standard, as it had the benzene standard in American
Petroleum,27 at the lowest feasible level without weighing expected
benefits against projected costs. 28 The standard's validity was at-
imposition of the plurality's own views on proper regulatory policy. Id. at 688, 712-13, 723-
24 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent attributed to the plurality's significant risk re-
quirement the effect of either "paralyz[ing] the Secretary into inaction," countermanding
the Act's protective purposes, or "forc[ing] him to deceive the public by acting on the basis
of assumptions that must be considered too speculative to support any realistic assessment
of the relevant risk." Id. at 716 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Finally, the dissent expressly re-
jected any construction of the Act which would require the performance of cost-benefit anal-
ysis. Id. at 717-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
25 See 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2483 (1981). The cotton dust standard established mandatory
maximum exposure levels for respirable cotton dust at 200 mg/m 3 for yarn manufacturing,
750 mg/m' for slashing and weaving operations, and 500 mg/m' for all other processes. Id. at
2486-87. In selecting the standard, OSHA considered recommendations from various organi-
zations. The industry suggested a 500 mg/m standard in yam manufacturing, which OSHA
rejected as not providing a sufficient level of protection. Id. at 2487. The Textile Workers'
Union of America recommended a 100 mg/m standard, which OSHA rejected as beyond the
"technological capabilities of the industry." Id. at 2487-88. The National Institute for Occu-
pational Safety and Health (NIOSH), the research arm of the Act established under 29
U.S.C. § 671 (1976), recommended a standard of 200 mg/m for all segments of the industry.
101 S. Ct. at 2486. Although OSHA adopted this exposure level as the proposed standard, it
relaxed this level in promulgating the permanent standard for technological and other rea-
sons. Id.; see 43 Fed. Reg. 27,360 (1978). The cotton dust standard appears in 29 C.F.R. §
1910.1043 (1981).
2 101 S. Ct. at 2487. The cotton dust standard defines "cotton dust" as:
dust present in the air during the handling or processing of cotton, which may
contain a mixture of many substances including ground up plant matter, fiber,
bacteria, fungi, soil, pesticides, non-cotton plant matter and other contaminants
which may have accumulated with the cotton during the growing, harvesting and
subsequent processing or storage periods.
Id. at 2483 n.6 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1043(b) (1980) (cotton dust standard)). Cotton
dust exposure first was regulated under the Walsh-Healey Act, which set a threshold limit
value of 1,000 mg/m for total cotton dust. 101 S. Ct. at 2485; see Walsh-Healy Act § 1, 41
U.S.C. § 35(e) (1976); 34 Fed. Reg. 7953 (1969). This standard was adopted as an interim
standard when the Act was passed. 101 S. Ct. at 2485; see note 2 supra.
27 See notes 12-13 and accompanying text supra.
28 See 101 S. Ct. at 2487; 43 Fed. Reg. 27,358 (1978). In assessing the economic feasibil-
ity of the proposed standard, OSHA considered two financial analyses, one which it had
commissioned and one prepared by the industry. The OSHA-contracted analysts estimated
the cost of compliance with the 200 mg/m proposed standard to be $2.7 billion, and con-
cluded that such cost would not seriously threaten the industry as a whole. 101 S. Ct. at
2501-02, 2504. The industry estimated at $543 million the cost of compliance with a less
stringent standard than the one ultimately adopted. OSHA scrutinized both analyses, find-
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tacked on the ground that under section 3(8) the standard must
address a significant risk and must result in significant reduction
of the risk in light of the costs involved.2 '
While recognizing that section 3(8) alone might be construed
to incorporate a balancing of costs and benefits, a majority of the
Court ° nonetheless refused to hold that section 3(8) imposes this
requirement on the Secretary in setting section 6(b)(5) standards.3 1
Instead, the majority interpreted section 6(b)(5)'s feasibility lan-
guage as precluding cost-benefit analysis.3 2 In relation to section
3(8), the Court construed this language as an additional and over-
riding requirement which Congress applied specifically to the sub-
category of standards regulating toxic substances.3 s The Court rea-
ing flaws in each, and ultimately determined the total compliance cost of the final standard
to be $656.5 million, 101 S. Ct. at 2498 n.44, which it found "well within" the industry's
financial capability, id. at 2501. For a full discussion of each estimate and how OSHA made
its feasibility determination, see id. at 2497-504.
29 101 S. Ct. at 2489. The industry filed suit in the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia pursuant to section (f) of the Act, which provides for preenforcement
judicial review of permanent health standards. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f) (1976).
20 Justice Brennan authored the opinion in which Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens joined. Justice Stewart dissented on the basis of the court of appeals' applica-
tion of the substantial evidence test and did not reach the cost-benefit/feasibility issue. 101
S. Ct. at 2506-07 (Stewart, J., dissenting). In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Rehn-
quist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued that section 6(b)(5) of the Act should be inval-
idated as violative of the nondelegation doctrine. Id. at 2507-10 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
It is interesting to note that Justice Powell took no part in the decision since he was the
only member of the Court to address the cost-benefit/feasibility issue when it was presented
in American Petroleum. In that case, Justice Powell had opined that the statute mandated
a cost-benefit analysis. 448 U.S. at 664-70 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judg-
ment); see note 18 supra.
31 101 S. Ct. at 2492. The Court declined to decide whether the "reasonably necessary
or appropriate" language of section 3(8), independent of section 6(b)(5), contemplates some
form of cost-benefit analysis. Id.
32 Id. at 2490-92. The majority noted that Congress had used specific language in other
statutes to require the performance of cost-benefit analysis. Absent such language, the
American Textile Court refused to read such a requirement into the Act. See id. at 2491-92.
Instead, it interpreted the word "feasible" in terms of its plain meaning, "capable of being
done." See id. at 2490. The Court concluded that in using the term "feasible," Congress
itself struck the balance between costs and benefits "by placing the 'benefit' of worker
health above all other considerations save those making attainment of this 'benefit'
unachievable." Id. Thus, the Court reasoned, any different balancing of costa and benefits
would violate the congressional mandate in section 6(b)(5). Id.
3 See id. at 2492. While holding that a feasibility analysis dominates the establishment
of permanent standards pursuant to section 6(b)(5), the Court noted that section 3(8) was
not without substantive content. It acknowledged, for example, the significant risk require-
ment which this section imposes on section 6(b)(5) standard setting. Moreover, the Court
indicated that section 3(8) might require OSHA to adopt the least financially burdensome of
various equally protective compliance methods. Finally, the Court left open the question
1982]
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soned, therefore, that to hold section 3(8) controlling would write
the feasibility requirement out of the Act, thereby frustrating con-
gressional intent.8 4
The Supreme Court's decisions in American Petroleum and
American Textile appear facially to conflict. While the former
opinion mandates a significant risk standard in assessing when
to regulate, 5 the latter decision calls for regulation to the extent
feasible once the decision to regulate has been made. 6 Neither de-
cision, however, mandates the application of quantitative cost-ben-
efit analysis.3 7 Such avoidance of the cost-benefit approach is nota-
whether section 3(8) imposes cost-benefit analysis on the setting of standards other than
those regulating toxic substances. Id. at 2493 n.32.
3, See id. at 2492. The majority observed that imposition of a cost-benefit analysis on
section 6(b)(5)'s feasibility standard would, in effect, write the feasibility standard out of
the Act since the exposure levels "would inevitably be set at the level indicated by cost-
benefit analysis, and not at the level specified by section 6(b)(5)." Id. This, the Court con-
cluded, would allow the provisions of a general definitional section to countermand the ex-
press provisions of a section specifically addressed to toxic substance regulation in violation
of the "well-settled rule that all parts of a statute. . . are to be given effect." Id. The Court
refused to impute to Congress such an intention. Id.
-- 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980) (plurality opinion).
36 101 S. Ct. at 2490. In American Textile, the Court found that by placing worker
protection above all other considerations, Congress had predetermined the requisite balance
between the costs and benefits of toxic substance regulation, thereby leaving OSHA power-
less to engage in further balancing, and prohibiting the Court from requiring it. See id. at
2488, 2490. Recognizing that section 3(8) may encompass cost-benefit balancing, the Ameri-
can Textile Court purported to reject its applicability to toxic substance regulation by as-
serting section 6(b)(5)'s superiority. Id. at 2492. Significantly, however, the decision is predi-
cated upon the fact that OSHA made a valid finding of significant risk, as required by
American Petroleum, before promulgating the cotton dust standard. Id. at 2488-89 n.25.
Thus, the Court confirmed section 3(8)'s applicability to section 6(b)(5) standard setting in
the form of the signficiant risk determination and implied that cost-benefit balancing takes
place at this level.
37 See 101 S. Ct. at 2491-92; 448 U.S. at 641. The American Petroleum plurality de-
clined to address the cost-benefit issue directly, 448 U.S. at 639; see id. at 667-68 (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and in the judgment), and the significant risk requirement which it enun-
ciated clearly does not require precise risk quantification, see id. at 655-66. In American
Textile, the Court expressly rejected the contention that section 6(b)(5) requires a cost-
benefit analysis, 101 S. Ct. at 2491-92, and held that "cost-benefit analysis by OSHA is not
required by the [Act] because feasibility analysis is." Id. at 2490. Clearly, then, American
Textile does not require the performance of cost-benefit analysis in setting section 6(b)(5)
standards. This holding was criticized by Justice Rehnquist, who interpreted it as permit-
ting, but not requiring, performance of cost-benefit analysis. Id. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dis-
senting). Although the American Textile holding might be susceptible to such interpreta-
tion, it is submitted that, if read in context, it precludes this possibility. After pronouncing
their holding, the majority explained that performance of cost-benefit and feasibility analy-
ses are mutually exclusive. Id. at 2490. Thus, the effect of requiring performance of feasibil-
ity analysis, and not cost-benefit analysis, is to preclude the use of cost-benefit analysis in
the setting of standards regulating toxic substances.
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ble, for although quantitative cost-benefit analysis can be an
invaluable decisionmaking tool,"8 it is clearly inappropriate in the
context of sections 3(8) and 6(b)(5). Effective application of a cost-
benefit test is, by definition, dependent upon accurate quantifica-
tion of both costs and benefits.39 Health benefits, however, resist
accurate quantification. 40 Indeed, although proponents of cost-ben-
efit analysis refer to the anticipated benefits of a health standard
in terms of the degree to which the standard will reduce risk,41
precise quantification of risk, and the extent to which it will be
reduced by a proposed standard, often is impossible under current
scientific methods.42 Moreover, even if precise quantification were
Baram, Cost-Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health, Safety and Envi-
ronmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473, 526 (1980). Cost-benefit analy-
sis is "[a] systematic technique for judging among alternative ways of trying to achieve the
same or related objectives.. . ." C. AwmsR & D. AmmER, DICTIONARY OF BusINEss AND Eco-
NOMics 99 (1977), which requires the quantification of the anticipated advantages and disad-
vantages of a proposed project, expressed typically in dollar amounts. See Baram, supra, at
477-78 & n.15; Parker, Quantitative Decision Techniques for the Health/Public-Sector Pol-
icy-Maker: An Analysis and Classification of Resources, 3 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 388,
389 (1978). A project is considered justified when its anticipated benefits outweigh its pro-
jected costs. Baram, supra, at 478. Cost-benefit analysis appears first to have been used in
the United States to evaluate government navigation projects. See A. DASGUPTA & D.
PEARCE, COsT-BENEFrr ANALYSIS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 12-13 (1972); Rogers, Benefits,
Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environmental Decisionmaking, 4 HARv. ENvT'L.
L. REV. 191, 210 (1980); Pear, Fiscal Plans Bear the Telltale Signs of Cost-Benefit Analy-
sis, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1982, § 4, at 2, col. 1. It has been suggested that a cost-benefit
analysis is most useful in the context of such public projects since both the advantages and
disadvantages accrue to society generally, see A. DASGUPTA & D. PEARCE, supra at 19,
whereas private regulation often involves the accrual of costs and benefits to different
groups, such as labor and management. See generally Parker, supra, at 393; Rogers, supra,
at 210-11.
" Zimmerman, Risk-Benefit Analysis: The Cop-out of Governmental Regulation, 14
TRIAL, Feb. 1978, at 43,44; see P. SELF, ECONOCRATS AND THE POLICY PROCESS: THE POLITICS
AND PHILOSOPm OF COsT-BENEFTr ANALYSIS 9 (1975).
40 Comment, Economic Feasibility of Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Under OSHA, 14 U.C.D.L. REv. 155, 159-60 & n.24 (1980) (citing H. PESIN & E. SESRIN,
CosT-BENEFrr ANALYSIS AND WATER POLLUTION POLICY 120-22 (1975)); see H. DASGUPTA &
D. PEARCE, supra note 38, at 112-17.
41 See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 504 & nn.23-24 (5th Cir.
1978), aff'd sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607
(1980); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of Environmental Carcinogens,
4 HARv. ENv'r'L. L. Rzv. 86, 87, 103-04 (1980). In American Petroleum, the court of appeals
suggested the use of a dose-response curve or animal studies to make projections of ex-
pected risks so that "OSHA will be able to make rough but educated estimates of the extent
of benefits expected from reducing the permissible exposure level." 581 F.2d at 504.
42 See 1A W. CONNOLLY, JR. & D. CRowELL I1, PRACTICAL GUME TO THE OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY AND HEALTH Ac'. LAW, PRINCIPLES & PRACTCES 390-91 (1977); Interagency Regula-
tory Liaison Group, Work Group on Risk Assessment, Scientific Bases for Identification of
1982]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:537
possible, it would be dependent upon knowledge of confidential in-
formation which industry may be reluctant to divulge.4 s Addition-
ally, sterile quantification of risk reduction cannot express the in-
tangible benefits that accompany saved lives and improved quality
of life."4 Therefore, quantification of health benefits based upon
projected risk reduction necessarily underestimates the extent of a
proposed standard's true beneficial effect and renders the accuracy
of the cost-benefit analysis questionable."
Quantification of cost also presents problems under the Act."
Potential Carcinogens and Estimation of Risks, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF CARCINOGENS IN
THE WORKPLACE: OSHA's CANCER POLICY 73, 89 (P. Hutt & A. Keller, chairmen 1980). For
an enumeration of the components of quantitative risk assessment, see id. at 95. See gener-
ally Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy
of Toxic Substances Control, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 497, 508-14 (1978); Leape, supra note 41, at
90-103.
43Although the Act requires the Secretary to keep confidential all information which
might contain trade secrets, 29 U.S.C. § 664 (1976), industry has been reluctant to provide
such information. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2499-
500 & n.51 (1981).
44 See N. ASHFORD, CRISIS IN THE WORKPLACE: OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE AND INJURY 325-
26, 330 (1976); T. KLEIN, SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BuSINESS 107 (1977); Doniger,
supra note 42, at 518-19; Rodgers, supra note 38, at 194-95. The problem of quantifying
intangible benefits has led one commentator to suggest their exclusion from cost-benefit
calculation. See Note, Section 6(b)(5) of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970:
Is Cost-Benefit Analysis Required?, 49 FORDHAM L. REV. 432, 440 (1980). Others have sug-
gested that quantification of these benefits be postponed as long as possible. Baram, supra
note 38, at 483-84. Moreover, it has been asserted that quantification of the value of human
life, in the context of cost-benefit analysis, is "morally and intellectually irresponsible." Id.
at 484.
5 See Comment, Cost-Benefit Analysis For Standards Regulating Toxic Substances
Under The Occupational Safety And Health Act: American Petroleum Institute v. OSHA,
60 B.U.L. REV. 115, 140-41, 143 (1980). One commentator has observed that "[b]y using the
word 'analysis,' [cost-benefit analysis] is given the trappings of a scientific procedure, and
thus, its conclusions are taken more seriously by the naive than they deserve to be." Zim-
merman, supra note 39, at 44; see G. BLOMQUIST, P. GRAVES & G. TOLLEY, 1 ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY: ELEMENTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS 186-87 (1981). This is due to the impossibil-
ity of accurate quantification of health risks and benefits, and the subjective nature of plac-
ing a dollar value on them. See Zimmerman, supra note 39, at 44; Note, OSHA After Ameri-
can Petroleum Institute: A Proposed Regulatory Budget, 33 STAN. L. Rsv. 917, 922-23
(1981); Comment, Economic Feasibility of Occupational Safety and Health Standards
Under OSHA, 14 U.C.D. L. Rev. 155, 159-64 (1980). Other commentators have observed
that applying cost-benefit analysis to the regulation of toxic substances forces the govern-
ment "to set a normative, value-laden policy judgment on the acceptable balance between
worker safety and its cost, and to apply that policy to imprecise, controversial information."
Berger & Riskin, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances
Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 287 (1978) (footnote
omitted). Thus, they conclude that "[o]bjective, reliable cost-benefit comparisons are never
possible" in the area of occupational health regulation. Id.
4 See G. BLOMQUIST, D. GRAVES & G. TOLLEY, supra note 45, at 87. It has been recog-
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This is largely because a principle function of the Act is to "force"
technology, that is, to foster the development of new techniques
and devices for improving workplace safety health conditions. 47 In-
deed, a standard which requires, for full compliance, more sophis-
ticated equipment than currently exists properly may be promul-
gated.48 Development of such new technology usually will involve
substantial initial expense, which may be expected to decrease in
time.49 Since calculation of this anticipated expense necessarily is
speculative and does not account for technological advancements,
the cost figure may be inflated, and hence, may not reflect a stan-
dard's true economic impact upon the affected industry.50 More-
over, it is likely that the cost of developing new technology would
dwarf anticipated health benefits.5 1 Notably, then, cost-benefit
analysis could discourage industry from developing more efficient
methods of improving workplace health conditions. The higher in-
dustry can show its compliance cost, the greater will be the likeli-
hood that the anticipated benefits will not justify that cost, and
that industry will escape regulation.2 Accordingly, cost-benefit
analysis actively frustrates the Act's technology-forcing function.
In light of the foregoing, it is evident that quantification of
nized that the quality of available knowledge on the costs and benefits of occupational
health regulation is poor. S. KELmAN, REGULATING AMERICA, REGULATING SWEDEN: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH POLICY 85 (1981). Although costs may
lend themselves more easily to quantification than benefits, their precise quantification still
is problematical. G. BLOMQUIST, D. GRAVES & G. ToLLEY, supra note 45, at 87. For a discus-
sion of the quantification problem generally, see P. SELF, supra note 39, at 67-93.
47 See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). Although there is no reference to "technology forcing" in the
Act's legislative history, W. CONNOLLY JR. & D. CROWELL 11, supra note 42, at 394, or in the
Act itself, courts have read this function into the Act, see AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d
109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975); 509 F.2d at 1309; Berger & Riskin, supra note 45, at 320-24.
48 See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). The Society of Plastics court admonished the industry peti-
tioners to have "more faith in their own technological potentialities." 509 F.2d at 1309. The
Third Circuit adopted this interpretation of the Act, but limited the broad language used in
Society of Plastics, stating that the required technology must "[loom] on today's horizon."
AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 121 (3d Cir. 1975).
4' See N. ASHFORD, supra note 44, at 338-39; Berger & Riskin, supra note 45, at 343. In
assessing the feasibility of the proposed cotton dust standard in American Textile, OSHA
relied in part on expert testimony and a study indicating that "by going to newer equipment
... there is a likelihood that increased production rates will result in recovery of some or
all of the capital cost of control." American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct.
2478, 2499 & n.47 (1981).
50 See G. BLOMQUIST, D. GRAVES & G. TOLLEY, supra note 45, at 88.
'1 See N. ASHFORD, supra note 44, at 337.
52 See generally Baram, supra note 38, at 490; Berger & Riskin, supra note 45, at 333.
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costs versus benefits is unwarranted under section 3(8) and section
6(b)(5). With respect to such conclusion, it is notable that Ameri-
can Petroleum's significant risk standard is not equivalent to
quantitative cost-benefit analysis. In contradistinction, the Ameri-
can Petroleum decision does not expressly require anticipated ben-
efits to be weighed against estimated compliance costs in assessing
the significance of a workplace risk.5 3 Rather, upon review of a sig-
nificant risk determination, OSHA is required only to show that
the "risk ... [was] quantified sufficiently to enable the Secretary
to characterize it as significant in an understandable way."" Fur-
thermore, the American Petroleum plurality stressed that this re-
quirement does not imprison OSHA in a "mathematical straight-
jacket, '5 5 and characterized the significant risk determination as
one of policy necessarily left to the Agency.56 The determination
need not be supported by "anything approaching scientific cer-
tainty. ' 57 As long as it is based on a "body of reputable scientific
thought" representing the "best available evidence," the determi-
nation will be upheld. 8 Interestingly, the Court specifically recog-
nized the Agency's need to "use conservative assumptions in inter-
'3 Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 639-40 (1980)
(plurality opinion). Although the American Petroleum decision reflects a concern that the
benzene standard's expected benefits, in terms of reduced risk exposure, would be "rela-
tively small" in light of its substantial compliance cost, id. at 629-30, the Court did not
expressly require anticipated benefits to be weighed against estimated compliance costs in
assessing the signficance of a workplace risk. See id. at 639-40; Note, supra note 45, at 925-
28; note 37 supra.
448 U.S. at 646.
5 Id. at 655.
" Id. at 655-56 n.62. The policy considerations inherent in OSHA determinations have
been noted by several circuit courts when reviewing section 6(b)(5) standards. One court
discussed these policy decisions, stating:
[S]ome of the questions involved in the promulgation of these standards are on
the frontiers of scientific knowledge, and consequently as to them insufficient data
is presently available to make a fully informed factual determination. Decision
making must in that circumstance depend to a greater extent upon policy judg-
ments and less upon purely factual analysis. Thus, in addition to currently un-
resolved factual issues, the formulation of standards involves choices that by
their nature require basic policy determinations rather than resolution of factual
controversies.
Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 474-75 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted)
(emphasis added); see American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 831 (3d Cir.
1978), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 917 (1980); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509
F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs.
Ass'n v. Brennan, 506 F.2d 385, 390 (3d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975).
57 448 U.S. at 656.
Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976)).
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preting the data ... risking error on the side of overprotection" of
worker safety.5 9 It seems that as long as OSHA creates a record
which lends itself to the substantial evidence standard of review,60
virtually any finding of significant risk will be upheld. 1
In enunciating the significant risk requirement, the American
Petroleum Court avoided quantitative cost-benefit guidelines for
determining when, pursuant to section 3(8), regulation of an un-
healthy workplace is warranted. 2 Similarly, the American Textile
Court properly prescribed a "feasibility" test, rather than quanti-
tative cost-benefit analysis, for determining the extent of OSHA
regulations. 3 Clearly, such a holding comports with the express
language of section 6(b)(5)." Nevertheless, the meaning of the
term "feasibility" is uncertain since it inadequately defines the de-
gree to which an existing disease rate must be reduced and the
maximum amount of expenditure which will be required to achieve
such reduction. 5 Indeed, there are several ways in which feasibility
09 448 U.S. at 656.
60 The substantial evidence test normally is applied to formal rulemaking procedures
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). While the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act authorized the creation of standards according to informal,
"notice-and-comment" rulemaking procedures, 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(2), (4) (1976), it specifi-
cally provides for judicial review under the substantial evidence test, id. § 655(f).
" See Comment, The Significant Risk Requirement in OSHA Regulation of Carcino-
gens: Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Institute, 33 STAN. L.
REV. 551, 556-60 (1981).
62 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 642 (1980)
(plurality opinion).
" See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478, 2490, 2506 (1981).
See id. at 2490-92 & nn.28-30; 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976); note 4 and accompanying
text supra.
"I Justice Rehnquist's dissent in American Textile and his concurrence in American
Petroleum are based on the vagueness of the term "feasibility" which, he averred, rises to
constitutional dimensions. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. at
2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst, 448
U.S. at 681-86 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in judgment). Indeed, Justice Rehnquist described
section 6(b)(5)'s feasibility language as a "legislative mirage, appearing to some Members [of
Congress] but not to others, and assuming any form desired by the beholder." American
Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 681 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring)). Accordingly, Justice Rehnquist found this language susceptible of a "remarka-
ble range of interpretations," 101 S. Ct. at 2508 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); it can be read to
require cost-benefit analysis, as the textile industry contended; to permit cost-benefit analy-
sis, as Justice Rehnquist inferred from the majority opinion; or to prohibit it, as OSHA
maintained. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Indeed, this possible range of interpretation was
realized in the circuit courts. See note 5 and accompanying text supra. Compare American
Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 503 (5th Cir. 1978) (cost-benefit analysis is re-
quired), afl'd on other grounds sub nom. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum
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analysis can be interpreted to facilitate its application. An absolute
feasibility standard, for example, would require industry to elimi-
nate all risk of disease associated with a toxic substance, regardless
of economic, technological, or other limiting factors .6  Such an ap-
plication of feasibility analysis, however, may be problematical.
The cost of risk reduction may not be static throughout the contin-
uum of reduction for a toxic substance. Rather, as the risk of dis-
ease approaches zero, each degree of reduction may require an in-
creasing rate of expenditure. 67 Moreover, such diminishing returns
may vary among toxic substances. Thus, the reduction of the dis-
Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) with American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636,
676-77 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (feasibility is the sole requirement under section 6(b)(5)), afl'd in
part and vacated in part sub nom. AFL-CIO v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478 (1981). Thus,
noted Justice Rehnquist, instead of providing precise guidelines for the promulgation of
standards regulating toxic substances pursuant to section 6(b)(5), the feasibility standard
"gives the Secretary absolutely no indication where on the continuum of relative safety he
should draw his line." Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 675
(Rehnquist, J., concurring). Justice Rehnquist concluded that the feasibility language of sec-
tion 6(b)(5) is merely an attempt by Congress to sidestep the "fundamental and most diffi-
cult policy choice-whether and to what extent 'the statistical possibility of future deaths
should . . . be disregarded in light of the economic costs of preventing those deaths.'"
American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(quoting Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 672), and conse-
quently, constitutes an impermissible delegation of that choice to nonelected officials. 101 S.
Ct. at 2509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
6 Inclusion of the word "feasible" in section 6(b)(5) was the subject of debate before
the OSHA bill was passed. Several senators objected to its inclusion, interpreting it as re-
quiring the establishment of a "utopia free from any hazards," 116 CONG. REc. 37,614
(1970), reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 1, at 480-81 (remarks of Sen. Dominick); see
Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. at 677-79. No circuit courts
reviewing section 6(b)(5) standards have taken so broad a view of the feasibility language.
The first court to review a permanent health standard promulgated pursuant to this section
rejected such interpretation, holding that practical considerations, specifically economic
considerations, can temper the Act's protective scope. See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodg-
son, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974); note 68 and accompanying text infra.
6 See Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301, 1308-09 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975). In Society of Plastics, industry challenged the validity of a
standard regulating vinyl chloride, pursuant to section 6(b)(5), on the grounds that the stan-
dard was economically unfeasible. See id. at 1308. Petitioners relied on a financial analysis
commissioned by the Department of Labor and used to set the maximum permissible expo-
sure level, which noted that "'costs of compliance increase rapidly with decreasing [expo-
sure] levels"' to the toxic agent. Id. (quoting FOSTER D. SNELL, INC., ECONOMIC IMPACT
STUDIES OF THE EFFECTS OF PROPOSED OSHA STANDARDS FOR VINYL CHLORIDE (1974)). This
observation illustrates the law of diminishing returns, also known as the law of variable
proportions. See C. AMMER & D. AMMER, supra note 38, at 118. Such phenomenon is defined
as "[t]he economic principle that, as successive units of a factor of production, (land, labor
or capital) are added in a particular enterprise, the additional output they generate de-
creases." Id.
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ease rate associated with toxic A may cost twice as much as a simi-
lar reduction of the disease rate for toxic B, with most of the addi-
tional expense involved in reducing the rate from a minimal level
to zero. It appears unfair to force the industry using toxic A to
bear an inordinate financial burden to reduce the disease rate to
zero, especially if a minimal level previously had been deemed ac-
ceptable under the threshold significant risk test. Application of
this test illustrates a further inequity in the zero option. An indus-
try not only may be required to spend large sums to reduce a risk
from a minimal level to zero, but it may be required to do so when
other risks, existing at a minimal level in the first instance, will
remain at such level merely because they were initially character-
ized as insignificant under section 3(8), and hence, were not
regulated.
Another possible application of feasibility analysis would re-
late the required levels of risk reduction and expenditure to the
regulated industry's economic capability to purchase such risk re-
duction, rather than uniformly requiring reduction to zero of dis-
ease risks. 8 Under such an "economic" feasibility standard, the
disease rate6" must be reduced to the lowest level that the regu-
lated industry can afford.7 0 Unfortunately, such an approach is
possessed of the same inequities as "absolute" feasibility. For ex-
ample, economic feasibility would require industry to reduce risks
below an acceptably minimal risk level, frequently at increasing
cost, merely because it can afford to do so. As in the case of an
absolute feasibility standard, this would impose greater financial
61 See Industrial Union Dep't v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Indus-
trial Union, the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia first enunciated the
"economic feasibility" test, recognizing that while the Act may require the adoption of stan-
dards which could substantially increase production cost, it does not require the adoption of
all technologically feasible measures irrespective of their prospective economic impact. Id.
Rather, a technologically achievable standard which adversely affects the regulated indus-
try's competitive structure might be considered unfeasible under the economic feasibility
test. Id. at 478; accord, American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-37 (3d Cir.
1978); AFL-CIO v. Brennan, 530 F.2d 109, 122-23 (3d Cir. 1975).
"' For purposes of this discussion, a disease rate is a function of two variables: a given
part per million exposure and the susceptibility to disease at such exposure level.
70 See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 617 F.2d 636, 661-62 (D.C. Cir. 1979), aff'd in part and
vacated in part sub nom. American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. 2478
(1981). In setting the cotton dust standard, OSHA chose the lowest exposure level that the
industry could implement without being put out of business by the cost of implementation.
See 617 F.2d at 661-62. The circuit court upheld the standard, relying on the guidelines for
economic feasibility it had enunciated previously in Industrial Union. See id; note 68 and
accompanying text supra.
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burdens on some industries than others for slight differences in the
degree of risk reduction and would force the reduction of risks ini-
tially characterized as "significant" to levels lower than those of
unregulated "insignificant" risks.
The economic feasibility test also is subject to several unique
drawbacks. For instance, it is conceivable that, in certain circum-
stances, such test may undermine the threshold significant risk re-
quirement. While the significant risk determination is the initial
triggering mechanism for regulation, it appears that an economic
feasibility standard would sanction toxic exposures above the
threshold significant risk level should the affected industry not be
financially capable of reducing toxic exposures to below such
threshold level. Surely, however, if the significant risk requirement
is to have any force, it would appear that the disease rate must be
reduced to at least this level, irrespective of cost to industry. 1 An-
other disadvantage of an economic feasibility test is that it would
shift the Act's focus by subordinating worker safety to financial
considerations. 2 In so doing, the test may act to the mutual disad-
vantage of industry and its employees. On the one hand, it has the
effect of penalizing profitable industries by requiring them to pay
more for safety merely because they have greater available re-
sources, not because they subject workers to greater risk. On the
other hand, the test may function to employees' disadvantage, af-
fording workers in one industry a lesser degree of protection than
workers in another industry because of differing profit margins of
the employing industries.
Of course, such flaws are not fatal to meaningful and judicious
application of feasibility analysis. Indeed, it is submitted that fea-
sibility analysis, when combined with the significant risk standard
promulgated in American Petroleum, offers a readily discernible
71 The Act's legislative history reveals congressional awareness of the potentially sub-
stantial cost involved in risk reduction and acceptance of such expense as a cost of doing
business. See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. at 2495-96. More-
over, it indicates that Congress intended to impose these costs on industry when necessary
to create safe working environments since these costs could otherwise be borne by workers
themselves, in medical expenses, wage loss, pain and suffering, and by society generally, in
decreased production and compensation payments. Id.
712 Cf. Sagoff, Economic Theory and Environmental Law, 79 MICH. L. REv. 1393, 1415-
17 (1981) (cost-benefit analysis subordinates aesthetic and moral values, central to environ-
mental regulation, to economic efficiency).
7 See Wheeler, High Court Coughs Up 'Faulty' Ruling on Cotton Dust Standard,
NAT'- L.J., July 27, 1981, at 28, 29, col. 2 (feasibility analysis accords workers in high-profit
industries more protection than those in less profitable industries).
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level of safety and defines the expenditures necessary to achieve
such level of safety. At the outset, it is evident that the significant
risk and feasibility tests are susceptible to graphical interpretation.
The threshold significant risk test, of course, is the maximum ac-
ceptable disease rate, and must be achieved irrespective of cost.
Thus, if a vertical axis is defined to be the disease rate and the
horizontal axis is defined as cost, the threshold significant risk
standard may be represented as a zero-slope curve,7" having a ver-
tical axis intersect at a preestablished maximum allowable disease
rate. 5 Significantly, in this regard, one commentator has suggested
that such maximum allowable disease rate should not be preestab-
lished, but rather, should vary in accordance with the toxic being
regulated.76 It appears, however, that such approach can only en-
gender inconsistent and inequitable regulatory efforts. Indeed, it is
submitted that a maximum allowable disease rate, although ini-
tially defined in light of legislative and judicial guidance, must not
be redefined from toxic to toxic. Otherwise, employees exposed to
any given toxic might be permitted to suffer greater risks than
those exposed to another toxic. Clearly, therefore, the zero-slope
significant risk properly may be represented as a constant.
The section 6(b)(5) feasibility test may, of course, be plotted
on the same axes as is the section 3(8) significant risk standard.
Unlike the constant and zero-slope significant risk curve, however,
7' As its name indicates, the slope of a line measures the inclination of a nonvertical
line segment plotted on a Cartesian coordinate system. See . MILLER & S. GREEN, ALGEBRA
AND TRIGONOMETRY 107-08 (2d ed. 1970); note 75 infra. A line which inclines upward from
left to right on the coordinate plane has a positive slope. Id. at 108. Conversely, the slope of
a line which inclines downward is negative. Id. Slope is expressed in numbers; the larger the
number, positive or negative, the steeper the slope, upward or downward. See A. SIMON,
ALGEBRA AND TRIGONOMETRY wrrH ANALYTIC GEOMETRY 99-101 (1979), The slope of a hori-
zontal line, then, is zero since it does not incline. See M. DOLCIANI & W. WOOTON, MODERN
ALGEBRA STRUCTURE AND METHOD 374 (rev. ed. 1973) (the slope of every horizontal line is
zero); L MMLER & S. GREEN, supra, at 108. See generally E. VANCE, MODERN ALGEBRA AND
TRIGONOMETRY 80-85 (3d ed. 1973).
71 The Cartesian system is a two-dimensional coordinate system consisting of perpen-
dicular lines, the vertical and horizontal coordinate axes. See T. DAvis, ALGEBRA AND TRIGO-
NoMETRY 70-73 (1972); L MILLER & S. GREEN, supra note 74, at 102. To represent the
threshold significant risk level on the coordinate plane, the vertical axis is designated as the
disease rate and graded from the point of origin, the point at which the vertical and hori-
zontal axes intersect, in increasing incidents of disease contraction. Similarly, the horizontal
axis is designated as compliance cost and graded from the point of origin in increasing dollar
amounts. Significant risk, as a constant value, is represented as a horizontal line, intersect-
ing the vertical axis at the point which represents a nontrivial incidence of disease requiring
regulation. This point is the vertical axis intersect.
76 See generally Comment, supra note 61.
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the feasibility plot must be representative of a range of risk reduc-
tion options, for the cost of diminishing the disease rate from ex-
posure to a toxic substance is proportional to the extent of such
reduction.7 Indeed, each unit of reduction of the disease rate re-
quires an expenditure of additional resources. Thus, if no money is
spent, the disease rate will remain unchanged. Conversely, the dis-
ease rate will approach zero as more funds are allocated to shield
workers from the disease causing toxic. This range of expenditures,
which purchases increasing improvements in a given disease rate,
may be termed a "feasibility curve." It is apparent, of course, that
the feasibility curve associated with each toxic substance will be
unique since the cost of shielding workers from various toxics will
vary in proportion to, inter alia, the ease of filtering the toxic.7 8
Thus, one may develop a number of feasibility curves, one for each
toxic substance.
Once the threshold significant risk curve and the relevant fea-
sibility curve are determined, their combined graphical depiction
provides a ready means for determining how much must be spent
in reducing exposure to a toxic substance. Plotting both the signifi-
cant risk standard and the feasibility curve for A given toxic on the
same graph, the level of expenditure required to reduce a given
exposure level is the point where the two curves intersect. Assume,
for example, that 1:1,000,000 cases of contraction of a disease is an
acceptable significant risk.79 Assume further that 1:1,000 workers
7 See note 67 and accompanying text supra.
78 A variety of factors impact upon the cost of reducing exposure to toxic substances. A
major factor is the method used to reduce the exposure. For example, OSHA standards
often can be implemented by alternative methods: work practice controls, such as sweeping
and the use of personal protective devices which remove the toxic substance from thWe nvi-
ronment after emission, or source controls, such as improved machinery which prevent emis-
sion. Source controls typically are substantially more expensive than work practice controls,
yet OSHA mandates implementation of section 6(b)(5) standards by source controls when-
ever possible. This is because OSHA interprets the Act as placing primary responsibility
upon employers to provide safe and healthful working environments in the first instance.
See ITO Corp. v. OSHA, 540 F.2d 543, 546 (1st Cir. 1976). See generally H. NORTHRUP, R.
ROWAN & C. PERRY, THE IMPACT OF OSHA 525-28 (1978).
79 See Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 655 (1980)
(plurality opinion). The 1:1,000,000 disease rate relied upon in this Comment as a proper
threshold significant risk level is extrapolated from the Court's discussion of significant risk
in American Petroleum. In its discussion, the Court stated that a 1:1,000,000,000 probability
of contracting cancer "clearly could not be considered significant." Id. Conversely, a 1:1,000
risk of disease "might well [be] consider[ed]... significant." Id. One in one million is cho-
sen as an intermediate figure between the two disease rates discussed in American Petro-
leum to represent a significant risk. It must be noted that the use of this figure does not
suggest its adoption as the proper significant risk level for all purposes. Notably, in discuss-
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exposed to more than 1000 micrograms of cotton dust per cubic
meter of air will contract bysinosis. Finally, assume that the cost of
reducing the disease rate of bysinosis to 1:1,000,000 would be $656
million and that reduction of the disease rate to zero would cost
$2.7 billion. 0 The significant risk versus feasibility curve for this
example would be represented as follows:
Disease Rate (log scale)
Toxic A
1:1,000,000 Significant
Risk
Feasibility Curve
+0
$656 $2,700
Cost (in millions)
It is evident from the preceding graph that the proper expen-
diture level is $656 million, and is identified by the point of inter-
section of the significant risk and feasibility curves. The equitable
ing the toxicity of food additives, one commentator recognized that no present methodology
permits absolute safety at any exposure level to toxic substances. Rodricks, Regulation of
Carcinogens in Food, in FEDERAL REGULATION OF CARCINOGENS IN THE WORKPLACE: OSHA's
CANCER POLICY 54, 62 (1980) (P. Hutt & A. Keller, chairmen 1980). Thus, the commentator
reasoned, there is a need for an "operational definition of safety," which presents a "reason-
able certainty of no harm." Id. at 63. The commentator approved of a "maximum lifetime
risk of ... not greater than one-in-one million." Id. at 65.
80 See American Textile Mfrs. Inst., Inc. v. Donovan, 101 S. Ct. at 2501-04. The $656
million and $2.7 billion figures are borrowed from the cost estimate used in promulgating
the cotton dust standard. See id. The factual situation in text, however, is different from the
factual situation with which OSHA and the reviewing court were faced. Therefore, use of
these figures is merely illustrative and does not purport to be representative of American
Textile.
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nature of this paradigm is demonstrated merely by plotting the
feasibility curve for another toxic, toxic B, on the same graph. The
parameters of toxic B are (1) the disease rate at the current expo-
sure level is 1:1,500,000, and (2) the cost of reducing exposure suffi-
cient to obtain a zero disease rate is $2 billion. Notably, in this
case, the American Petroleum signficant risk threshold test pro-
vides that exposure levels to toxic B need not be reduced, for the
substance does not pose a significant health risk. Surely, however,
toxic A, merely because the current disease rate is greater than the
significant risk level, need not be reduced to a disease rate below
the disease rate for toxic B. The significant risk/feasibility curve
intersection, however, forestalls this inequity:
Disease Rate (log scale)
Toxic A
1:1,000,000 
Significant
Risk
Feasibility
Curves
Cost
The above graph vividly demonstrates that if the disease rate
associated with toxic A is to be reduced to below 1:1,500,000, the
industry using toxic A has been overregulated vis-a-vis the indus-
try using toxic B. Should the significant risk/feasibility curve inter-
section be used as a risk reduction objective, however, it is clear
that overregulation cannot occur. Indeed, it is through such inter-
pretation of the American Petroleum and American Textile deci-
sions that inequitable and unwarranted overregulation may be pre-
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vented since in no case must a given disease rate be reduced to
below the preestablished maximum allowable rate. Hence, al-
though not all industries will be confronted with OSHA regula-
tions-because not all work environments pose significant risks to
those employed therein-those industries which are forced to re-
duce toxic exposures need only achieve the disease rate already ob-
tained by other nonregulated employers.
CONCLUSION
From an industrial employer's perspective, an OSHA decision
to regulate may appear to be an unfortuitous and inequitable
event, given that such employer, but not other unregulated em-
ployers, must spend scarce resources to achieve what OSHA has
determined to be an acceptable toxic exposure level. Apparent in-
equity will be transformed into real injustice, however, should cer-
tain industries remain unregulated while others, because subject to
OSHA regulations, must achieve lower toxic exposure levels than
their unregulated counterparts. It is hoped that the paradigm out-
lined in this Comment can serve to forestall such a result.
Maria E. Buscarello
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